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The beggar-thy-neighbour aspect of commodity advertising means that beneﬁts to one
commodity from advertising come at the expense of other commodities. The effect
can be mitigated by cooperation among groups as shown by Alston, Freebairn and James
(AFJ). A drawback to AFJ’s analysis is that some cooperative outcomes require side
payments from one producer group to another. This paper offers a bargaining solution as
an alternative to cooperation in the case where cooperative side payments would be
needed. We show that while bargaining without side payments is not as effective as
cooperation at reducing beggar-thy-neighbour effects, it is a welfare improving alter
native to non-cooperation and is likely more practical in many situations.
Key words: cooperative and non-cooperative solutions, excessive advertising, mandated
commodity promotion programs, Nash bargaining, US beef and pork.

1. Introduction
Generic advertising has become one of the most contentious issues in
agricultural policy. In the past decade alone, three cases challenging the
Constitutional validity of generic advertising programs have been heard by
the US Supreme Court (see Crespi (2003) for a history and rationale behind
the litigation). Although hundreds of studies show beneﬁts to growers from
commodity promotion exceeding the costs (see the review and discussion of
studies in Kaiser et al. (2005), for example), many farmers mistrust the
marketing boards that oversee the programs and question whether the beneﬁts
reach all farmers. As a result, the courts have taken an interest in distributional
aspects both within and across programs.
Partly in response to the controversy, agricultural economists have begun
to look beyond the ‘ﬁrst-order’ impacts of the marketing programs on the
farmers who fund them and, increasingly, into the second-order, or distributional
effects of generic advertising. One strand of the literature on second-order
effects focuses on how generic advertising affects different groups of farmers

within a program (Chung and Kaiser 2000; Crespi and Marette 2002, 2003).
This present analysis contributes to a second strand of the literature, which
focuses on how advertising by one program affects producers in a competing
program (Alston et al. 2000, 2001). However, as we discuss later, the implications
may also be useful to within-program distributional issues of the ﬁrst strand.
Most discussion and examples are provided in the context of US legislation
and producer groups, but the policy issues translate to levy-funded advertising
conducted by Australian producer groups.
Alston, Freebairn and James (AFJ) (2001) showed that if commodity
promotion programs across industries could cooperate in the setting of their
advertising expenditures, the programs could overcome a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’
effect, in which one commodity group beneﬁts at the expense of the other. In
the case where commodities are substitutes, for instance, an advertising-induced
increase in the demand for peaches may come at the expense of pear consump
tion and vice versa. AFJ demonstrated that by cooperating in the setting
of advertising expenditures, producer groups in the cooperating industries
could earn more proﬁt.
AFJ optimised the aggregated proﬁt functions of the cooperating producer
groups without restricting the distribution of proﬁts. As such, there exists a
likelihood that one producer group would gain more from the cooperative
advertising, or even that one producer group could lose revenue. In order for
the cooperative advertising to be feasible, AFJ proposed using lump-sum
transfers or ‘side payments’ from gainers to losers such that all groups enjoy
a net gain from cooperating. For example, if peach and pear growers cooperated
in setting advertising quantities for their two industries and pear growers
earn less proﬁt by cooperating, they would need to be compensated with side
payments from the peach growers. In fact, in AFJ’s simulation example com
paring non-cooperative and cooperative models of beef and pork advertising,
although aggregate proﬁts were higher, cooperative advertising made pork
producers worse off unless they received a lump-sum transfer from the beef
producers. Hence, without such a payment, there would be no reason for the
pork producers to enter into an agreement that would lead to cooperative
advertising.
The need for such side payments is, in fact, well established in the literature
on cartel formation. If ﬁrms in a cartel have asymmetric costs, for example,
Schmalensee (1987) demonstrates that joint proﬁt maximisation necessarily
dooms a cartel to failure unless side payments exist, the ﬁrms are merged, or
members are prevented from deviating from the cartel.
As AFJ showed, if side payments were allowed, all of the programs
operating under a cooperative advertising venture could be made better off
than if the programs continued to advertise independently. However, a problem
in the US context is that side payments are not allowed under the generic
advertising legislation. For example, the Almond Marketing Order (1950) that
allows the Almond Board of California to assess growers in order to pay for
generic almond advertising stipulates that any funds not used for almond

promotion, almond research or to cover the Board’s administrative activities
pertaining to almond promotion or research must either be returned pro rata
to almond handlers or used to reduce the assessments on almonds in the next
crop year (§981.81). Other US checkoff legislation includes similar stipulations.
Even if transfers were to be made legal in the US, we surmise that politically
they would still be very difﬁcult for a board made up of industry players to
achieve without grower member distrust. Indeed, even within a marketing
order that covers only one commodity, squabbles over redistribution of
assessment funds have led to serious breakdowns. As Crespi (2003, p. 301)
discusses, one impetus for the litigation over almond promotion came from
the Almond Board’s decision to reimburse assessments paid by one almond
handler while refusing reimbursements to other handlers. If such decisions
lead to litigious antagonism within an industry, one can conjecture that the
discord would be magniﬁed when transferring funds from one industry to
another.
Given the power of AFJ’s results but the practical difﬁculty of side payments,
it is worth considering other ways boards could cooperate to make producers
better off than they are under the current beggar-thy-neighbour advertising
battles. One alternative is the horizontal integration of related industries.
Some multi-industry cooperative marketing occurs on a limited basis. The
Australian Meat and Livestock Corporation, and the Australian Horticultural
Corporation provide multi-industry export promotion, for example. Perhaps
the closest case of a truly integrated marketing board is the California
tree-fruit agreement (CTFA). The CTFA is an umbrella marketing and
research program that facilitates the activities of the peach, plum and nectarine
programs. However, legally each program is stand-alone and has its own
board determining assessments and contributes a ﬁxed share to the CTFA
for generic advertising of stone fruits. By statute, transfers of funds from one
group to another are not allowed under US marketing order legislation, so
peach growers can neither fund promotion of plums nor transfer funds to
nectarine growers, for example. For any of these programs, the allowance of
side payments from one industry to another or the creation of a fully
integrated marketing cartel would entail changes in US legislation. In the
United States, commodity promotion laws have existed virtually unchanged
since the 1930s and commodity promotion is arguably one of the most con
tentious of all farm programs. However, Congress has shown little interest in
changing the laws and seems to have passed the issue on to the courts who
review dozens of lawsuits every year.
We present a ‘second-best’ alternative in the spirit of AFJ’s model that
increases returns to producers while both mitigating the beggar-thy-neighbour
effects and leaving unaltered the current checkoff legislation. The key is to
choose advertising in a manner that embeds, to some extent, the side
payments necessary for AFJ’s model. Allowing boards to meet jointly to
bargain over the amount of advertising that each board will perform would
eliminate the need for overt monetary transfers while complying with current

legislation. Current US marketing order statutes do not prevent groups from
discussing advertising levels with each other. In addition, neither the anti
trust laws in the Sherman Act nor the restrictions of the Federal Trade Com
mission Act prevent groups from bargaining over advertising levels.
In this type of bargaining scenario, for instance, peach growers and pear
growers might come to an agreement to lessen their advertising intensities so
as to dampen the beggar-thy-neighbour effects. In fact, the CTFA is a good
example as the three separate entities may attend and make comments at
each other’s meetings and share budgets for joint research and promotion.
While we do not doubt the likelihood that a lawsuit could be brought against
boards that undertake bargaining over assessments, we do not see any
legislation that would be undermined by a bargaining solution, especially if
negotiations are voluntary. The question is how to characterise a bargaining
solution, and under what conditions would such a bargaining arrangement
for advertising be stable?
There are many bargaining models in the economics literature; in the next
section we discuss why we use the Nash bargaining model and derive the
necessary conditions for a bargaining outcome in advertising expenditures.
We then demonstrate the effectiveness of bargaining using a simulation based
on AFJ’s analysis of the US beef, pork and poultry industries.
2. Nash bargaining
AFJ’s article is based upon the observation that the advertising set by one
commodity board results in decreased demand for substitute goods and can
impose a cost on other industries. The result is an inefﬁcient use of advertising
resources in all industries. Coase (1960) argues that agents can overcome this
type of problem by arriving at a mutually advantageous agreement and that
this agreement would also be socially efﬁcient (see Samuelson 1985 for a
theoretical discussion of the relationship between the Coase theorem, bargaining
theory and cooperative game theory). Thus, private bargaining between com
modity boards seems a viable means of mitigating beggar-thy-neighbour
effects. However, there are a variety of models that might be used to model
the bargaining outcome.
Many models are based on zero-sum games where the agents are trying
to determine how some ﬁxed resource should be shared. Roth (1985) and
Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) provide overviews of the literature. However,
in the case of commodity promotion, zero-sum games are too limiting as the
purpose of the advertising may be as much to increase the size of the market,
as to alter its shares. Another class of bargaining models examines deals
struck through repeated trials where agents must worry about the threat of
deviation and develop trigger strategies to deter cheating, as discussed in
Rubinstein (1982, 1985) and Gibbons (1992, p. 68). However, commodity
promotion assessments cannot be altered once they are approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and are part of public record, so cheating and trigger

strategies are not necessary components to a model of bargaining in com
modity promotion.
In short, we seek a model that allows for boards to either enter into a
bargain over the amount of advertising they will spend or walk away from
the bargaining table and continue spending at their current levels. We also
seek a model that allows for Pareto improvements under the agreed upon
advertising assessments without need for side payments. Finally, we seek a
static model that does not necessitate trigger strategies or repeated games
given that an outside agent holds the boards accountable to the agreed upon
assessments. Without priors about exactly how the bargaining procedure
might take place (e.g. will it be a sequential offer procedure, will there be a
time constraint, what happens when impasses arise?), or foresight concerning
the bargaining environment (e.g. risk attitudes, bargaining strengths or discount
factors of the parties), several models could be used to represent the bargaining
process. The model we have chosen is the Nash bargaining model (1953). A
beneﬁt of the particular static model of the Nash program is that Binmore
et al. (1986) demonstrate that this framework can approximate two common
types of strategic models that use alternating offers.
In his 1950 work and his 1953 extension, Nash addressed the case where two
agents bargained over some division that would result in agent 1 agreeing to take
q1 and agent 2 agreeing to take q2 without need for renegotiation. The sum of
q1 and q2 does not need to be ﬁxed beforehand, and ‘may also be regarded as
a non-zero-sum two-person game’ (Nash 1950, p. 155). Nash showed that under
very general conditions, the two agents will agree to a pair (q1B , q2B ) that maximises
the product of the difference between (q1B , q2B ) and each agent’s next best
alternative, provided each difference is positive. The model assumes symmetric
bargaining power in that all Pareto-improving outcomes are feasible.
Nash’s solution requires adherence to four axioms in order for an equilibrium
to be reached: (i) an invariance property that linear transformations of the
payoff functions do not affect the outcome; for example, arbitrary changes in
units cannot affect the utility each player receives from the payoffs; (ii) Pareto
efﬁciency; (iii) individual rationality, such that the solution must not be
dominated and a player’s payoff must be greater than or equal to her payoff
from choosing not to bargain; and, ﬁnally (iv) independence from irrelevant
alternatives, such that the outcome of a bargain cannot depend on the
availability of alternative bargains that were rejected when a player had the
opportunity to choose them.
Formally, for an n-player problem (see, for example, Gintis 2000, p. 346),
the Nash Bargaining Theorem states that there is a unique solution
(q1B , q2B , . . . , qnB ) = ( f1(S, d1, d2, . . . , dn), f2(S, d1, d2, . . . , dn), . . . , fn(S, d1, d2, . . . , dn))
that satisﬁes (i)–(iv) and that this solution deﬁnes (q1B , q2B , . . . , qnB ) as the vector
that solves max ∏ni=1(π i (qi ) − π i (di )) subject to (q1, q2, . . . , qn) ∈ S where S is the
q1 , ... ,qn

set of real-number potential payoffs, and (d1, d2, . . . dn) ∈ S denote the
agents’ next-best options if no agreement is reached. There is no incentive for
any agent to deviate from the unique solution.

3. Optimal advertising in a bargaining model
Following AFJ, we consider a model of n goods that are related in demand
but not supply. Quantities and prices (Qi, Pi for i = 1 to n) are endogenous
and determined in a competitive market. Ai represents the generic advertising
expenditure by each of m producer groups where m ≤ n. Demand and supply
equations for the n goods are thus:
Qi = di (P1, P2 , . . . , Pn , A1, A2 , . . . Am ),
and
Qi = si (Pi P ),
where Pi P is the producer price, which differs from the buyer price depending
on the type of ﬁnancing for the checkoff program: Pi P = Pi, Pi P = (1 – ti)Pi, or
Pi P = Pi – Ti, under lump-sum, ad valorem, and per-unit funding, respectively.
As the framework for developing the bargaining solution is similar regardless
of the ﬁnancing mechanism (lump-sum, ad valorem, per-unit), we motivate
the model using the bargaining solution under lump-sum advertising as an
example. Following AFJ, to determine a group’s status-quo position, we deﬁne
the non-cooperative optimisation problem of producer group i under a lumpsum funding mechanism as:
max π i = Pd
i i (P,
1 P2 , . . . , Pn , A1, A2 , . . . , Am ) − TVCi (Qi (⋅)) − Ai ,
Ai

where TVCi (Qi (·)) is the total variable cost of production and the group
optimises subject to market-clearing conditions (i.e. di (P1, P2, . . . , Pn, A1,
A2, . . . , Am) = si( Pi P )).1
Using AFJ’s notation, the superscript N (non-cooperative) denotes optimised
N
N
N
N
N
values when each group acts on its own. Speciﬁcally, π i ≡ π i (A1 , A2 , . . . , Am )
is the optimal proﬁt in the case where the commodity groups choose their
advertising expenditures independently. The non-cooperative equilibrium for
the special case of n = m = 2 is shown in Figure 1. The ﬁrst group’s reaction
function, R1(A2), shows that group’s optimal advertising as a function of
advertising spending by the other group; R2(A1) is deﬁned similarly. The
non-cooperative equilibrium occurs where the reaction functions intersect at
point N. The slopes of the reaction functions are expressed as functions of
elasticities in AFJ (equation (26)), and are negative for most reasonable ranges
of elasticity values, provided the products are substitutes. Group 1 makes more
proﬁt when group 2 spends less on advertising, so iso-proﬁt contours closer
1

Our modelling of the market equilibrium follows that of AFJ because of the comparison
we are drawing to that study. However, an equivalent motivation would be to model the decisionmaking process in terms of a multistage game as in Zhang and Sexton (2002) whereby the
board makes its advertising decision in stage 1 and ﬁrms react to this decision in stage 2.

Figure 1 Non-cooperative, cooperative and bargaining equilibria.

to the horizontal axis represent higher proﬁts for group 1 (and similarly for
group 2).
AFJ were interested in the optimal advertising when commodity groups
could cooperatively choose each member’s advertising expenditure – in other
words, a cartel’s choice of advertising spending. At points enveloped by the
reaction functions in Figure 1 (the area with vertical and/or horizontal hatching),
at least one producer group is made better off relative to the non-cooperative
equilibrium. Optimisation of the combined proﬁts of the two groups yields a
point in the single- or double-hatched area, but if the optimal combined
proﬁts fall in one of the single-hatched areas, one group will actually do
worse than in the non-cooperative outcome as illustrated by an example case
of point C. Hence, as AFJ show, it is in these areas where a group would need
to be compensated through a ‘lump-sum transfer to compensate the group
experiencing a loss’ (Alston et al. 2001, p. 895). This observation is consistent
with Schmalensee’s (1987) result that cartel solutions from aggregated proﬁt
equations of asymmetric ﬁrms are unstable in the absence of side payments.

In this paper, we are interested in the optimal choice of advertising among
commodity groups who agree to undertake a level of advertising expenditure
under a type of bargaining cartel. Because a group can always leave a cartel
and act on its own, π iN is then the opportunity cost of undertaking any other
amount of advertising. Because of the Pareto efﬁciency requirement, under
the Nash bargaining solution, each commodity board must earn at least this
amount in order to enter into the bargain. In an optimal bargaining outcome,
each producer group should arrive at advertising expenditures that will make
its constituents better off while internalising some or the entire side payment
amount that might arise under AFJ’s solution – that is, the bargaining
equilibrium, B, must fall on the locus of tangencies of the iso-proﬁt contours
within the double-hatched area of Figure 1.
From the previous section, the Nash optimisation program for the bargaining
model with lump-sum advertising is then,
m

max

A1, A2 , . . . , Am

∏(π i − π iN ).
i=1

Deﬁning φi ≡ π i − π iN , the i th ﬁrst-order condition with respect to Ai is
m

1 dφ j
= 0.
j dAi

∑φ
j=1

Solving the maximisation problem under the market-clearing conditions
and rearranging terms gives us the bargaining solution for lump-sum (B |LS )
advertising as implicitly deﬁned by:
m

B |LS
i

A

=

d ln P φ

∑PjQ j d ln Aj φ i .
j =1

i

(

j

This bargaining solution is very similar to AFJ’s cooperative solution, AiC
(equation (13) in AFJ). The cooperative solution weighs individual PjQj (d ln Pj /
d ln Ai) terms by one, reﬂecting the maximisation of a simple sum of producer
group proﬁts. In the bargaining solution, the j th term is weighted by φi /φj .
Comparisons between the cooperative and bargaining solutions are similarly
derived when advertising is funded with a per-unit or ad-valorem check-off; the
only change is the choice variable (Ti or ti), and, hence, the optimisation program
that determines π iN. In the case of per-unit ﬁnancing, π iN is the result of the choice
of Ti to maximise π i = (Pi − Ti )di (P,
1 P2 , . . . , Pn , A1, A2 , . . . , Am ) − TVCi (Qi (⋅))
subject to the condition that all checkoff funds are spent (i.e. Ai = TiQi) and
the market-clearing conditions. As above, the bargaining solution from the
program in Equation (4), but now under the choice of per-unit checkoff
(B |PU ) ﬁnancing may be derived implicitly as:
m

AiB |PU =

d ln P φ

∑PjQ j d ln Tj φ i .
j =1

i

j
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Journal compilation © 2007 Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Ltd

We have written Equation (7) in terms of the resultant advertising
expenditure in order to show its similarity with Equation (6). Finally, in the
case of ad valorem ﬁnancing, π iN is the result of the choice of ti that optimises
π i = P(1
− ti )di (P1, P2 , . . . , Pn , A1, A2 , . . . , Am ) − TVCi (Qi (⋅)), subject to all
i
checkoff funds being spent (Ai = tiPiQi) and the market-clearing conditions.
The bargaining solution for advertising funded by an ad valorem check-off
(B |AV ) is derived similarly:
m

AiB |AV =

d ln P φ

∑(1 − t j )PjQ j d ln t j φ i .
j=1

i

j

As in the case of the lump-sum advertising result, the cooperative solutions
for the per-unit and ad valorem programs from AFJ differ from the bargaining
solutions only by the inclusion of the φi/φj weights.
It is interesting to consider the implications of Equations (6)–(8) in light
of AFJ’s results. These equations show that the cooperative and bargaining
solutions would coincide if the producer cartel chose to maximise a weighted
sum of producer proﬁts, using φi/φj as weights, giving less weight in the
determination of advertising expenditures to the price effects in markets
where producer groups gain more by bargaining. What the bargaining solutions
offer, then, is a way of embedding the side payments in the advertising outlays
themselves by adjusting the expenditures in proportion to the relative gains
from entering into the bargaining arrangement. The φi/φj terms do not reﬂect
bargaining power, but rather adjust the groups’ advertising inﬂuences on all
commodities. While aggregate proﬁts can never be higher than under AFJ’s
cooperative model, all groups are made better off than they would be under
the non-cooperative scenario. If the gains are equal ( φi/φj = 1) then Equations
(6)–(8) revert to AFJ’s cooperative solutions and there is no difference between
arriving at the optimal advertising by bargaining or joint-proﬁt maximisation.
Equations (6)–(8) suggest that commodity groups have an alternative to
both non-cooperation and AFJ’s cooperative model that has the potential to
increase industry proﬁts entirely through the board’s choice of the advertising
expenditure and transfers to competing industries need not be considered.
4. Simulations and comparison to AFJ’s results
In order to examine the effects of a bargaining outcome, the numerical
simulations in AFJ were repeated using the objective functions from the
Nash bargaining model. Demand functions for beef, pork, and poultry were
speciﬁed, using the same functional form and parameter values as in AFJ.
Supply functions were speciﬁed, again using the same functional form and
elasticity values. The Solver tool in Microsoft Excel was used to ﬁnd beef and
pork advertising expenditures that maximised the Nash bargaining objective
functions vis-à-vis the non-cooperative fallback position, subject to marketclearing conditions. Table 1 provides the results from the non-cooperative,

Table 1

Effects of funding methods and behavioural assumptions on optimal advertising

Variable of interest

Non-cooperative
competition

Beef and pork
producers cooperate

Beef and pork
producers bargain

Lump-sum funding
Optimal advertising expenditure (US$ million/year)
Beef producers
32.44
Pork producers
13.28
Total beef and pork
45.72

23.47
0.00
23.47

14.99
5.35
20.34

Optimal advertising intensities (per cent of revenue)
Beef producers
0.06
Pork producers
0.04
Total beef and pork
0.05

0.05
0.00
0.03

0.03
0.02
0.02

Beneﬁts from advertising (US$ million/year)
Beef producers
246
Pork producers
33
Poultry producers
–291
Beef and pork producers
279
All producers
–13

656
–319
–35
338
303

251
36
–275
287
13

Ad valorem funding
Optimal advertising expenditure (US$ million/year)
Beef producers
41.77
Pork producers
21.47
Total beef and pork
63.24

31.43
0.00
31.43

20.72
9.49
30.21

Optimal advertising intensities (per cent of revenue)
Beef producers
0.08
Pork producers
0.06
Total beef and pork
0.07

0.06
0.00
0.04

0.04
0.03
0.04

Beneﬁts from advertising (US$ million/year)
Beef producers
248
Pork producers
38
Poultry producers
–296
Beef and pork producers
287
All producers
–9

647
–304
–48
343
294

253
41
–283
294
12

Notes: Values in the ‘Non-cooperative competition’ and ‘Beef and pork producers cooperate’ columns come
from Alston et al. (2001), table 3. Actual advertising expenditures for 1998 were used to parameterise the
model: US$25.51 million for beef, and US$13.79 million for pork.

cooperative and bargaining solutions (the results for the non-cooperative and
cooperative solutions are from AFJ’s table 3) for two types of funding.
The results for both the lump-sum ﬁnancing and the ad valorem ﬁnancing
tell very similar stories. When beef and pork commodity groups set their
advertising budgets not as a cartel but rather through bargaining, total
spending on advertising is less than in the non-cooperative and cooperative
cases. Further, as discussed above, advertising can be seen to be split more
evenly between beef and pork producers, rather than all advertising being
conducted for beef, as in the cooperative case. The bargaining model essentially
‘embeds’ the side payments from the cooperation model within the advertising
itself. Under a bargaining model with lump-sum ﬁnancing, for example,

although the beneﬁts from advertising to beef and pork producers combined
are less than in the cooperative case (US$287 million vs US$338 million),
they are an improvement over the non-cooperative case (US$279 million),
with both commodity groups enjoying positive beneﬁts.
Interestingly, in this example, the optimisation strategy has a pronounced
effect on poultry producers: the cost to poultry producers of beef and pork
advertising is reduced greatly when the groups cooperate, but the bargaining
outcome is only slightly more favourable than for the non-cooperative case.
While beef and poultry producers beneﬁt from cooperation at the expense of
pork producers, all three groups beneﬁt from a switch from the non-cooperative
to the bargaining outcome.
5. Extensions
For demonstration purposes, we restricted our attention to the original Nash
model where each group is assumed to have the same bargaining strength.
Clearly the simulations demonstrate that an assumption of symmetric
bargaining strength does not imply that the gains will be symmetric, as much
depends upon the market conditions and fallback positions of the parties.
Nonetheless, our analysis could be extended to a model with asymmetric
bargaining power provided the degree of bargaining strength could be
determined. A simple extension of Nash’s model to allow for an exogenous
bargaining-strength parameter can be found in Eichberger (1993, p. 255). 2
The result would include the bargaining strength parameters in the optimal
advertising solutions.
The bargaining model may also be a very useful tool within a commodity
program itself. For example, organic producers or producers of particular
varieties often express a preference to differentiate their product rather than
to be part of a generic promotion program. Generic advertising of differentiated
products covered in one marketing order could, likewise, result in beggarthy-neighbour effects among members of a commodity group. A bargaining
arrangement where advertising expenditures are set as proposed here offers a
practical improvement for allocating promotional budgets for a checkoff
program. In this case, subgroups could form their own micromarketing
boards covering their particular commodity and then bargain over the checkoff
rates or advertising expenditures for these subsets of products covered in the
macro marketing order. Legislative changes to the checkoff programs would
be needed to accommodate different rate structures within the program and
additional costs would be incurred to prevent individual farmers in one
group from cheating by claiming they are part of another group. The beneﬁt

2

Speciﬁcally, the solution would be to the following extension of the Nash model:
n
(π i (si ) − π i (d i ))γ where γi represents an exogenous bargaining strength parameter
∏ i=1
max
s ,..., s
i

1

n

and Σγi = 1.

of a bargaining framework, though, may be that producer organisations
would be able to keep all producers under the umbrella of an overarching
program but allow for adjustments of advertising expenditure by subgroups
within the program.3
6. Conclusion
The beggar-thy-neighbour aspects of commodity advertising, where one
group beneﬁts from advertising its own product at the expense of other
commodities, are mitigated by cooperation among groups as shown by
Alston et al. (2001). The drawback to the AFJ analysis, however, is that some
cooperative outcomes require side payments from one producer group to
another. In the US, side payments are practically impossible unless commod
ity boards and commissions were legislatively granted authority to make
them. We have shown that while bargaining is not as effective as cooperation
at reducing beggar-thy-neighbour effects, it may be both more feasible and
perceived as more equitable by commodity groups because all that is required
is an alteration of advertising spending by each of the commodity boards.
Since the alteration of the advertising expenditure as shown here will increase
industry proﬁts, bargaining would be in keeping with a board’s mandate to
increase grower returns through advertising. Certainly, other decision rules,
legislative speciﬁcations or board organisations may provide feasible or more
efﬁcient solutions to the beggar-thy-neighbour problem. The beneﬁt of the
bargaining process outlined here is that it would require relatively small
institutional changes.
References
Almond Marketing Order (1950). Handling of almonds grown in California. 7 USC 981.
Alston, J.M., Chalfant, J.A. and Piggott, N.E. (2000). The incidence of the costs and beneﬁts
of generic advertising, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 82, 665–671.
Alston, J.M., Freebairn, J.W. and James, J.S. (2001). Beggar-thy-neighbor advertising, American
Journal of Agricultural Economics 83, 888 – 902.
Binmore, K., Rubinstein, A. and Wolinsky, A. (1986). The Nash bargaining solution in
economic modelling, RAND Journal of Economics 17, 176–188.
Chung, C. and Kaiser, H.M. (2000). Distribution of generic advertising beneﬁts across partic
ipating ﬁrms, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 82, 659–664.
Coase, R.H. (1960). The problem of social cost, Journal of Law and Economics 3, 1–44.
Crespi, J.M. (2003). The generic advertising controversy: how did we get here and where are
we going? Review of Agricultural Economics 25, 294–315.
Crespi, J.M. and Marette, S. (2002). Generic advertising and product differentiation, American
Journal of Agricultural Economics 84, 151–161.

3

A reviewer pointed out that the content of advertising may be another dimension of
bargaining, particularly within a commodity group with heterogeneous products. The CTFA,
discussed above, does use a production-share weighting of each fruit’s assessments to pay for
generic stone-fruit advertising. Theoretically, the shares could be determined through bargaining.

Crespi, J.M. and Marette, S. (2003). Are uniform assessments for marketing orders optimal if
products are differentiated? Agribusiness 19, 367 –377.
Eichberger, J. (1993). Game Theory for Economists. Academic Press, London.
Gibbons, R. (1992). Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton University Press,
Princeton, NJ.
Gintis, H. (2000). Game Theory Evolving. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Kaiser, H.M., Alston, J.M., Crespi, J.M. and Sexton, R.J. (eds) (2005). Commodity Promotion
Programs in California: Economic Evaluation and Legal Issues. Peter Lang Publishing, New
York, NY.
Nash, J. (1953). Two-person cooperative games, Econometrica 21, 128–140.
Nash, J.F. Jr (1950). The bargaining problem, Econometrica 18, 155–162.
Osborne, M.J. and Rubinstein, A. (1990). Bargaining and Markets. Academic Press, San
Diego, CA.
Roth, A.E., ed. (1985). Game-theoretic Models of Bargaining. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
Rubinstein, A. (1982). Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model, Econometrica 50, 97–109.
Rubinstein, A. (1985). A bargaining model with incomplete information about time preferences,
Econometrica 53, 1151–1172.
Samuelson, W. (1985). A comment on the Coase theorem, in Roth, A.E. (ed.), Game-theoretic
Models of Bargaining. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 321–340.
Schmalensee, R. (1987). Competitive advantage and collusive optima, International Journal of
Industrial Organization 5, 351– 367.
Zhang, M. and Sexton, R.J. (2002). Optimal commodity promotion when downstream markets
are imperfectly competitive, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 84, 352–365.

© 2007 The Authors
Journal compilation © 2007 Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Ltd

